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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to have Section 43-2-1 (prohibiting taxi cabs
involved in intra-city operations from picking up passengers in Salt Lake
City unless such taxi holds a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from
Salt Lake City) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City declared
unconstitutional or void.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was submitted on Memoranda Brief of the parties.

From a

ruling in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff of no cause of
action, Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his favor
as a matter of law declaring Section 43-2-1 as amended of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City unconstitutional or void.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no real dispute of the facts. The Plaintiff has taxi cab
licenses issued by the Cities of Alta, Sandy, and West Jordan, Utah, and
by Salt Lake County.

A substantial portion of Plaintiff's business

results from transporting passengers from Salt Lake City's International
Airport, which is within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, to the
ski resorts of Alta and Snowbird.

The Plaintiff does not solicit fares

within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City.

The Plaintiff, C. Edward Butt

has been denied this right by Section 43-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City.

Such ordinance, amended on February 27, 1974, provides

that no person shall operate a vehicle for hire upon the streets of Salt
Lake City without first having obtained a Certificate of Public Convenience
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and Necessity from the Board of Commissioners of the Defendant Citye

The

ordinance specifically provides that for the purpose of this Section, the
term "operate for hire upon the streets of Salt Lake City" shall include
the soliciting or picking up a passenger or passengers within the corporate
limits of Salt Lake City whether the destination shall be within or outside
the corporate limits of the City.

It is this definition of the phrase,

"operate for hire upon the streets of Salt Lake City" that the Plaintiff
takes exception to.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.

THERE ARE NO STATUTORY POWERS GRANTED TO UTAH CITIES OR
TOWNS ENABLING THEM TO PROHIBIT THE OPERATORS OF INTERCITY TAXI CABS FROM PICKING UP A PASSENGER OR PASSENGERS
WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF SALT LAKE CITY WHEN THE
DESTINATION SHALL BE OUTSIDE THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF
SUCH CITY.

Any such power granted to cities or towns must be derived from either
10-8-14 or 10-8-39 U.C.A, 1953.
Section 10-8-14 applies only to transportation systems operated wholly
vithin the corporate limits of such City or Town, and therefore does not
ipply to inter-city transportation companies. See Provo vs> Dept, of
business Regulation, 218 P 2d 675.
Section 10-8-39 grants Cities and Towns the power to license, tax, and
egulate *** cabs and taxi cabs, and solicitors therefore; *** .
A municipality has only such powers as are expressly granted it by
le legislature, such as may be necessarily implied and incident to those
cpressly granted, and those indispensible to the accomplishment of the
clared objects and purposes of the municipality; but where any fair,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Reasonable, substantial doubt exists, such doubt is resolved against the
municipality.

See Salt Lake City vs. Revene, 101 Utah 504 124 P 2d 537

(1942).
In the instance case, the Plaintiff's taxi cab company simply uses
the streets of Salt Lake City for the purpose of traveling thereon as
used by the public generally; the Plaintiff does not solicit passengers
within the corporate limits of the City; the fares which the Plaintiff's
taxi cabs cater to are generated by the Ski Resorts and not by the
Defendant City; and the Plaintiff's operation is in no way detrimental to
the public health and welfare of the City.

The Defendant City's only

purpose for such and ordinance is to reserve the lucritive Ski Resort
business for the City's own licensed taxi cabs.
It is obvious that there is no express grant, nor can one be fairly
implied; and certainly it is not indispensable to the accomplishments of
the health and welfare of the City.
The emergency clause of the amended ordinance declared that the
amendment is necessary to the peace, health, and welfare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City.

While municipalities have expressed grants to

that which this emergency clause says, the clause itself does not cure
the defect of the ordinance.

The defect is: An ordinance enacted in

furhterance of such objectives must bear a reasonable relation to its
purposes, and where any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt exists, such
doubt is resolved against the municipality.

See Parker, d/b/a Lyndon

Disposal Service vs. Provo City Corp., Case No. 14087 filed December 11,
1975.
PERRY VS. CITY COUNCIL OF SALT LAKE, 25 P 739 ANALYZED.

(Trial

court evidently relied heavily on this case, see third paragraph R-28.)
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The ruling in this case seems to be that a statute which grants a City or
Town the power to license, regulate, and tax also grants the power to
prohibit.

This case involves Salt Lake City's power to license, regulate,

tax, and even prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors* At the time this
case was decided, Utah did not have a law specifically prohibiting the
sale of intoxicating liquor. By verified petition, Perry showed compliance
in all respects with the expressed statutes and the ordinances in making
his application for a liquor license. Salt Lake City, also in a verified
return, stated that the applicant intended to sell liquor in a room of
the basement of a theater. Retail sale of liquor in theaters was
specifically prohibited by statute. The verified return also showed

that

the area involved was occupied almost exclusively by residences; that
about 20 rods from the theater are a public school and a house of religious
worship; and that 10 or 20 rods from them is another church; and that there
was one saloon1 in the avenue opposite the theater, believed to be sufficient to supply all reasonable demands there; and, in conclusion, the
Defendant claimed that it acted within its discretion in refusing to grant
the license, and that the sole purpose of the council members in doing so,
was the desire to preserve public order, and the morals and happiness of
the people of the neighborhood.
In the opinion the Judge then opined, "The power is conferred on a
deliberative body, and its authority with respect to the subject is not
limited to mere ministerial duties. The power of the legislature was unlimited with respect to the business, and all of it except the power to
)rohibit, subject to a few restrictions named, was conferred by the charter
ipon the local legislature;

It is apparent from the act under consideration

;hat the intention of the legislature in conferring on the council the
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power to regulate the sale of liquor was to enable that body to protect
society from the evils attending it; *** under the power to regulate,
the business may not be prohibited. *** "The exercise of a reasonable
discretion as to the localities in which the business would be carried
on would appear to be within the power to regulate; a saloon along the
side of a schoolhouse or a church would be very undesirable, and to
establish one along side a man's home would be regarded as very objectionable; to authorize the retailing of liquors in the midst of the houses

l

of people would be palpably wrong; neighborhoods infested with liquor
saloons are not suitable communities for boys and girls to grow up in;
and so a limitation of the number of places of retailing intoxication
liquors in the City would be a reasonable regulation. ***. " The Judge
then cited a Federal case..."There is no inherit right in a citizen to
thus sell intoxication liquors by retail;.

It is not a privilege of a

citizen of the state, or a citizen of the United States. As it is a
business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said,
be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will
limit to the utmost its evils." flThe manner and extent of regulation rests
in the discretion of the governing authority1) Then, in the last paragraph
of the opinion, the Judge stated, "After a careful consideration of the
statutes, the ordinances, and the cases cited, we hold that the Defendant
posesses the power to license, regulate, and tax the liquor business,and
that in the use of such authority, it may exercise a reasonable discretion
in determining who are suitable persons to entrust the businesses to, the
places where it may be conducted and the number of licenses it will issue,
and that the council may exercise th^t discretion when the application is
made *** ."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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From these excerpts, it can readily be seen that the Judge did not
intend to state that a grant of power to license, regulate, and tax is
also a grant of power to prohibit. What the Judge is really saying is
that in certain special circumstances where the activities licensed
might constitute a danger to the health and welfare to the inhabitants
of the City, it is in the discretion of the Judge to prohibit same. Thus,
by my way of thinking, Perry vs. the City Council of Salt Lake (which was
tried in 1891) pretty much dictates the same result as Parker d/b/a Lyndon
Disposal Service vs. Provo City Corp., Case No. 14087 and filed on December
11, 1975. To me, the Perry case definately does not stand for the position
that a grant of power to license regulate, and tax also give the power
to prohibit, (as the trial Judge in the above-entitled case evidently
concluded).
Point 2. SECTION 43-2-1 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY
ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH, AND REPUGNANT TO THE UTAH
MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION ACT (CHAPTER 6 OF TITLE 54,
U.C.A., 1953),
Section 54-6-3 U.C.A., 1953 states:

"TRANSPORTATION FOR COMPENSATION

ON PUBLIC HIGHWAYS. No common or cor/tract motor carrier shall operate
any motor vehicle for the transportation of either persons or property for
compensation on any public highway in this State except in accordance with
the provisions of this Act."
Section 12 of the Act specifically exempts licensed taxi cabs operating
vithin a fifteen mile radius of any City or Town. Under the provisions of
this Act, the Public Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over all
;axi cabs operating beyond a fifteen mile radius of the limits of the Town
n which they are licensed.

The Public Service Commission has the power to
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and has granted state wide authority, county wide authority, and area
authority to numerous individuals and companies operating taxi cabs.

If

Section 43-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City is valid, then
a taxi cab with state wide or county wide authority from the Public Service
Commission could not enter the corporate limits of Salt Lake City and pick
up a passenger or passengers from the Airport, or other location within the
City, even though the destination of the passenger is outside the corporate
limits of said City.

It must also be obvious, that if all Cities and Towns

adopted ordinances similar to Salt Lake City's 43-2-1, the Public Service
Commission County or State wide authority to taxi cabs would be valid only
when the passenger pick-up takes place in the unincorporated areas of the
State, and therefore would be of little or no value. This was obviously
not the intention of the legislature,

In order to give validity to the Utah

Motor Vehicle Transportation Act, the power of a City or Town to prohibit
inter-city taxi cabs from picking up passengers at the Airport, or other
designated City areas, when the destination is outside the corporate limits
of said City or Town, must be limited to operators of taxi cabs operating
wholly within the corporate limits of the City - or at least within a
fifteen mile radius of the corporate limits of such City.
Point 3. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES THAT PROHIBIT OPERATORS OF INTER-CITY
TAXI CABS FROM PICKING UP A PASSENGER OR PASSENGERS IN THE
CORPORATE LIMITS OF SAID MUNICIPALITY WHEN THE FINAL
DESTINATION OF SAID FARE IS OUTSIDE SAID CORPORATE LIMITS,
VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT GUARANTEED UNDER THE 14th
AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
"Every citizen has an unaliable right to use the highways and the City
streets for the purposes of travel and transportation either for business
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or pleasure, subject to legislative control or such reasonable regulations
as to traffic thereon or the manner of using them as the legislature may
deem otherwise proper to adopt." See Escabido vs. State Dept. of Motor
Vehicles, 222 P 2d 1.
In Corey vs. Dallas, 352 F Supp. 977, the Court stated, "The right to
earn a livelihood by following one's legitimate occupation is a right
implicit in the 14th amendment"; "legislation effecting a fundmental right
can withstand challenge under equal protection clause only if there is no
other practical manner in which the objective of the legislation can be
accomplished and interest of governmental authority is superior to the
rights of the person adversely affected by the legislation," and "if
classification effects a 'fundamental right', its constitutionality is to
be judged on basis of whether classification is necessary to promote a
compelling state interest."
Here again, the Plaintiff taxi operator simply uses the streets of
Salt Lake City for the purpose of traveling thereon as used by the public
generally; the Plaintiff does not solicit passengers within the corporate
limits of the City; the fares which the Plaintiff's taxi cabs cater to
are generated by the Ski Resorts and not by the Defendant City; and the
Plaintiff's operation is in no way detrimental to the public health and
welfare of the City.

It is obvious that there can be no compelling State

interest in denying the Plaintiff this right.
Respectfully Submitted

in G. Gibbs
Attorney forJJ^rntfff_and
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